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Botnets Presentation For Malware Class (Hacking Illustrated Series InfoSec Tutorial Videos)

Botnets Presentation For Malware Class

I have to present two papers for my malware class, so I figure I'd share my practice video with my readers. Slides are available in PDF and PPTX forms.

 

Blip.tv:

To download, right click the link below:
http://blip.tv/file/get/Irongeek-malwarebotnets619.mp4

Text version of the slides:

Article presentation for:
The Dark Cloud: Understanding and Defending against Botnets and Stealthy Malware
Based on article by:
Jaideep Chandrashekar, Steve Orrin, Carl Livadas, Eve M. Schooler

Available at:
http://download.intel.com/technology/itj/2009/v13i2/pdfs/ITJ9.2.9-Cloud.pdf 

This presentation by:
Adrian Crenshaw


Background
A little information to get you up to speed on botnets
So, what is a Botnet?
• A collection of compromised computers that can be sent orders
• Individual hosts in a Botnet are know as bots or zombies
• The administrator of the Botnet is often known as a “Bot Herder”
• A few examples of Botnets include:
Storm
Kraken
Conficker


Botnet life cycle
(As outlined by the article)
• Spread Phase
– SE Spam, Web drive bys, Network worm functionality, etc.
• Infection Phase
– Polymorphism
– Rootkitting
• Trojan binaries
• Library hooking
• Command and Control Phase
• Attack Phase
How do hosts become part of a Botnet?
• Drive by malware installs via web browsers
• Automated or targeted network vulnerability attacks
• End users socially engineered to install them via phishing attacks, or confusing browser messages
• Other vectors…
Botnet Source Code Families
• Lots of source code is out there:
– Agobot
– Rxbot
– SDBot
– Spybot
– Others…
http://leetupload.com
Search for BotNet.Source.Codes.rar
How are Botnets controlled?
• Decentralized Command and Control Channels (C&C)
• Decentralization is important to make C&C harder to shutdown
• By using Command and Control Channels, “bot herders” can change what their Botnet is tasked to do, and update the Botnet’s nodes
Illustration of C&C
Illustration of C&C: Another take
Illustration of C&C: Yet another take
Illustration of C&C: Blind drop
Economics of Bot Herding
• So, why would some one want a Botnet?
– Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS)
• Personal vendettas
• Protection money
– Spam (both email and web posts)
– Adware
– Click Fraud
– Harvested identities (Sniffers, Key Loggers, Etc.)
• They can also be rented out for tasks
• BBC show Click rents a Botnet:
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/13Cx-LNrTfU/


Problems with detecting/removing a Bot installation
Main points from the article:
• Polymorphism
• Rootkitting
• Only periodic communications back to controller
Others:
• Retaliation Denial of Service
• Distributed
• Fast Flux
• Encrypted channels

Article’s proposal: Canary Detector
Made with three main strategies (paraphrased):
• Establish a baseline for the network.
• Use end-host detection algorithm to determine botnet C&C channel, based on destinations that are regularly contacted.
• Aggregate information across nodes on the network to find commonality.
Canary Detector: Atoms
• Uses the tuple:
– destIP/dstService = Host being contacted
– destPort = Port number
– proto = UDP or TCP
• Examples:
– (google.com, 80, tcp)
– (208.67.222.222, 53, udp)
– (ftp.nai.com, 21:>1024, tcp)
– (mail.cisco.com,135:>1024,tcp)
Canary Detector: Persistence
• Look for “temporal heavy hitters”
– Not so concerned about amount of traffic
– Concerned about regularity
• Starting with a small tracking window (w) time, track if an Atom was contacted or not
• Set an observational time window (W), for example W=10w in duration
• The authors also use multiple time scales 1 through 5
Canary Detector: Commonality
• How common is a destination Atom amongst network nodes?
• The more common the Atom, the more important it is
Canary Detector: Whitelists
• Ignore “safe” Atoms to easy computation
• Observe traffic during training period to see common, regularly contacted Atoms (Windows update servers might be an example)
• Set nodes to ignore, adjust as needed.
• Whitelists are established at both the host and network level.
Canary Detector: Alarm Types
• p-alarms (persistence): When a destination Atom not contained in the host’s whitelist becomes persistent. More for local use, whitelist or flag.
• c-alarms (commonality): When a destination atom is observed at a large number of end-hosts in the same window and is identified as common. More for network use, whitelist or flag.
Using the information
• Article defines thresholds for persistence and commonality (p* and c*) for when to take note
• Suspicious alarms can be acted upon
– Nullrouting
– Investigation
– Cleanup

Tested against real bots
• SDBot: Controlled over IRC, but easy to spot because of connecting to irc.undernet.org. Scans ports scans on ports 135, 139, 445, 2097 looking to spread.
• Zapchast: Five IRC service atoms (about 13 distinct IPs). Mostly NetBIOs attack traffic.
• Storm: P2P based. The traces were two orders of magnitude larger than the other botnets tested.

Graph of botnet Atom persistence
• SDBot (Triange)
• Zapchast (Dimonds)
• Storm (Blue Dots)
– Note that they only
graphed 100 atoms


Links for more research
• The Dark Cloud: Understanding and Defending against Botnets and Stealthy Malware
http://download.intel.com/technology/itj/2009/v13i2/pdfs/ITJ9.2.9-Cloud.pdf 

• Shadow Server
http://www.shadowserver.org

• SANs Internet Storm Center
http://isc.sans.org/

• Honeynet Project
http://www.honeynet.org
 
• LAN of the Dead
http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/computerzombies
 

Conclusions/Questions
• How difficult is it to choose good thresholds for persistence/commonality?
• What if Botnets varied their call back times?
• System overhead?
• Whitelisting of services that have become blind drops?
• Audience questions?

 

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