

OCCULT COMPUTING AND ANTI-FORENSICS

Adrian Crenshaw




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About Adrian

- I run Irongeek.com
- I have an interest in InfoSec education
- I don't know everything I'm just a geek with time on my hands





Short Version

- There is a longer talk on this subject I did: <u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/anti-forensics-occult-computing</u>
- For those that want to leave early, here is the VERY short version:
- 1. Maintain physical control of your computer.
- 2. Use full hard drive encryption.
- 3. Keep things separate.



Why Occult Computing?

- Occult comes from the Latin word occultus (clandestine, hidden, secret), referring to "knowledge of the hidden".
- Forensic: Relating to the use of science and technology in the investigation and establishment of facts or evidence in a court of law.
- Since hiding activities is what we are doing, Occult Computing seems like a good name.
- Since people are not necessarily hiding their activities from a court of law, the term anti-forensics may not always apply.
- Occult Computing sounds cooler than Anti-forensics ⁽²⁾
 Cthulhu fhtagn

http://Irongeek.com

Thanks to Wikipedia and Wiktionary for wording of definitions

What's this talk about?

Why:

- Not about just hiding your stash from the Fuzz...
- Law/policy enforcement may find it useful to know how folks hide their computer activities
- Users may want to know how to hide their activities from invasive law/policy enforcement
- Companies may want to know how to clear boxes before donating them
 What:
- Mostly Windows, but most ideas are applicable to other operating systems
- Not going to cover malware analysis, nor network anti-forensics (at least not much)
- Mostly we will cover hiding tracks left on storage media



Four categories

- 1. Don't leave tracks in the first place
- 2. Selective file removal and encryption tools
- 3. Parlor Tricks
- 4. Nuke it from orbit, it's the only way to be sure




Irongeek's first two rules of personal security/privacy

- 1. If it's not easy, folks won't do it.
- If it's not secure there's no point in doing it.



What anti-forensic techniques are likely to be seen?
Bow down before my Venn diagram of doom!!!



- Just deleting a file
- 2. Selective file wiping and encryption
- 3. Full drive wiping and encryption
- 4. Hidden partitions
- 5. Stego



BACKGROUND INFO

Stuff that's useful to know



Interesting legal stuff IANAL

- Julie Amero <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero</u> <u>http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/434/</u>
- Sebastien Boucher
 <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United States v. Boucher</u>
- The "Hacker Defense" <u>http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Legal_issues</u> <u>http://exforensis.blogspot.com/2008/07/troljan-horse-defense.html</u>
- If the system is set to wipe data at regular intervals normally, that may be ok. Wiping data once an investigation is about to be underway will make things worse.
- Spoliation: Someone screwed up the evidence
- CSI effect <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSI_effect</u>
- Plausible Deniability Tool Kit (PDTK) <u>http://www.nmrc.org/pub/pdtk/</u> <u>http://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-archives/dc-14-archive.html#weasel</u>




Tech Stuff

- It's hard to cover this in order.
- You need to understand some things before you understand others, but which you have to understand first is questionable.
- Windows jams data in all sorts of places, and there are tools to make this data fairly easy to recover.



Disks, Tracks, Sectors

- A. Track
- B. Geometric Sector
- C. Track Sector
- D. Cluster



Slack Space

Yum...Leftovers!!!

RAM slack (but name no longer really applies) and Residual slack

Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	С	D	E	F	A 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
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04049E90	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	ILE2FILE2FILE2FI
04049EA0	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	LE2FILE2FILE2FIL
04049EB0	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	E2FILE2FILE2FILE
04049EC0	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	2FILE2FILE2FILE2
04049ED0	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	FILE2FILE2FILE2F
04049EE0	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	ILE2FILE2FILE2FI
04049EF0	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	LE2FILE2FILE2FIL
04049F00	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	E2FILE2FILE2FILE
04049F10	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	2FILE2FILE2FILE2
04049F20	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	FILE2FILE2FILE2F
04049F30	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	ILE2FILE2FILE2FI
04049F40	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	46	49	4C	LE2FILE2FILE2FIL
04049F50	45	32	46	49	4C	45	32	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	E2FILE2
04049F60	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049F70	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049F80	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049F90	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049FA0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049FB0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049FC0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049FD0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049FE0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
04049FF0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0404A000	65	31	66	69	6C	65	31	66	69	6C	65	31	66	69	6C	65	elfilelf lelfile
0404A010	31	66	69	6C	65	31	66	69	6C	65	31	66	69	6C	65	31	1file1file1file1

Hash

One way functions: Easy: md5("I am a string") = "1710528bf976601a5d203cbc289e1a76" Hard: String("1710528bf976601a5d203cbc289e1a76") = ("I am a string")

Can be used to fingerprint files, or see if they have changed http://Irongeek.com

Host-Protected Areas and Disk Configuration Overlay

- Parts of the drive that can be set aside that normal OS and BIOS functions can't see
- Possible to hide data there, but it's a pain
- Taft (he's one bad mother....) <u>http://www.vidstrom.net/stools/taft/</u>
- More info

http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/DCO and HPA





Forensically interesting areas in the Windows file system

- Way too many to list, but lets check some out: <u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/windo</u> <u>ws-forensics-registry-and-file-system-spots</u>
- Nirsoft has a lot of tools for grabbing data: <u>http://www.nirsoft.net/</u>
- Deft Linux <u>http://www.deftlinux.net/</u>



DON'T LEAVE TRACKS IN THE FIRST PLACE

PrOn mode and places data hides



Privacy mode (aka porn mode) in browsers



Firefox (Private Browsing)

- Keyboard shortcut: Ctrl+Shift+P
- Command line: No command line, but can be set on start via Tools>Options>Privacy "Use custom setting"



- IE (InPrivate)
- Keyboard shortcut: Ctrl+Shift+P
- Command line: -private
- Chrome (Incognito mode)
 - Keyboard shortcut: Ctrl+Shift+N
 - Command line: --incognito



Opera (kiosk mode)

- Ok, not quite the same thing, but maybe someone will email me a solution
- Do some research online to see how good your browser's "porn mode" really is.




Private portable browsers

- Portable Apps <u>http://portableapps.com/apps/internet</u>
- Tor Browser Bundle <u>http://www.torproject.org/easy-download.html.en</u> Firefox based, comes with Tor and Pidgin
- OperaTor

<u>http://archetwist.com/opera/operator</u> Opera based, comes with Tor

Keep in mind, Tor != Secure





Other Darknets

- Darknets Talk: <u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/dark</u> <u>nets-i2p-tor-phreaknic</u>
- I2P

http://www.i2p2.de/



Boot media

Linux:

- Knoppix
 <u>http://www.knoppix.net/</u>
- Ubuntu
 <u>http://www.ubuntu.com/</u>
- Unetbootin
 <u>http://unetbootin.sourceforge.net/</u>

And so many more... Look up the noswap option

Windows:

- Bart PE <u>http://www.nu2.nu/pebuilder/</u>
- Ultimate Boot CD for Windows
 <u>http://www.ubcd4win.com/</u>
- WinBuilder
 <u>http://winbuilder.net/</u>





SELECTIVE FILE REMOVAL AND ENCRYPTION

For those that don't want to go all the way





Links to automated selective wiping tools

- Clean After Me <u>http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/clean_after_me.html</u>
- CCleaner
 <u>http://www.ccleaner.com/</u>
- And many more....



Tools for selective file wiping

DD

dd if=/dev/zero of=f:\Notes.docx bs=12940 count=1 I like this Windows version: <u>http://www.chrysocome.net/dd</u>

Sdelete

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897443.aspx

Eraser

http://eraser.heidi.ie/

 *nix guys, look into Shred <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shred %28Unix%29</u>



Just slack and unused space

- Eraser
- Cipher that comes with Windows as a command line EFS tool

Run once:

cipher /w:g:

Schedule script: REM at 2:00 /every:m,t,w,th,f,s,su c:\defragandcipher.bat defrag c: /f defrag c: /f defrag c: /f

cipher /w:c:\

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Selective File Encryption

EFS

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypting File System

- Hash insertion does not help (Pnordahl)
- Can read file names
- Best to use a SYSKEY password or boot key
- TrueCrypt
 <u>http://www.truecrypt.org/</u>
 <u>http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcexplorer/</u>
- FreeOTFE <u>http://www.freeotfe.org/</u>
- Good encryption does not compress much



Reasons why relying on selective file wiping is not a good idea


- Windows jams data in all sorts of places, it's hard to get them all
- You got the main file, but what about the temp?
- Defrag, moving files and abandoned clusters
- USB device logs
- Page and hibernation files
- Data carving ^(C)





Defrag issues

- You defrag a drive
- You wipe a file on that drive
- What about the remnants of the file from before the defrag?



file 1 left overs
file 2 left overs
file 3 left overs





USB device log

- Ah, so the suspect has a camera/thumbdrive/iPod/etc
- USBDeview <u>http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/usb_devices_view.html</u>
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\ USB
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\ USBSTOR
- Search for "USBSTOR" in c:\windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log



Page file

 File used for swapping memory: pagefile.sys

Linux folks, investigate swap space



Disable page file

Disable:

Control Panel->System and Security->System->Advanced System Settings->Performance->Advanced->Virtual

Memory->Change


Virtual Memory		×
☐ <u>A</u> utomatically mana □ Paging file size for eac	age paging file size for all drives	
Drive [Volume Label]	Paging File Size (MB)	
C: E: F:	System managed None None	
Selected drive: Space available:	C: 48526 MB	
C <u>Custom size:</u> Initial size (MB); Ma <u>x</u> imum size (MB);		
O System managed		
No paging file	<u>S</u> et	
Total paging file size for Minimum allowed: Recommended: Currently allocated:	16 MB 5947 MB	
	OK Cancel	



Wipe page file

Set
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet
 \Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\
 ClearPageFileAtShutdown to 1

🗐 Local Group Policy Editor			<u> </u>						
<u>File Action View H</u> elp									
Local Computer Policy	Policy	Security Setting	•						
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I Network Li≤	Shutdown: Allow system to be shat down without nawing to log on Shutdown: Clear virtual memory pagefile	Disabled							
⊕ □ Foblic Key ⊕ □ Software R	System cryptography: Force strong key protection for user keys	Not Defined							
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🕀 🍌 Policy-based Q	Bystem settings: Optional subsystems	Posix							
🕀 🚞 Administrative Tem	🕃 System settings: Use Certificate Rules on Windows Executables f	Disabled							
🖃 💰 User Configuration	📖 User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Admi	Disabled							
	🕅 User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for	Disabled							
	🕃 User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for admi	Elevate without prompting							
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	In User Account Centrel, Detect application installations and prompt	Eashlad							




Hibernation file

 File used for storing active memory when going into hibernation mode: hiberfil.sys
 Go into power setting to disable



Data carving

Go down the drive bit by bit looking for file headers





- DiskDigger <u>http://dmitrybrant.com/diskdigger</u>
- Photorec

http://www.cgsecurity.org/wiki/PhotoRec

- Other file carving tools
 <u>http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Tools:Data_Recovery#Carving</u>
- File system compression makes file carving far less reliable!



So, what is writing where?

What needs to be wiped? What is this tool doing?

Process Monitor

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896645.aspx

- RegFromApp <u>http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/reg_file_from_application.html</u>
- ProcessActivityView <u>http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/process_activity_view.html</u>



PARLOR TRICKS

Maybe useful sometimes, but mostly fluff



Tool/Solution Kiddies

- Does the examiner understand the concepts, or just the tool?
- Think back to the Julie Amero case
- What is their case load like?





Timestomp

- Making the chain of events hard to manage <u>http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/antiforensics/</u>
 - -m <date> M, set the "last written" time of the file
 - -a <date> A, set the "last accessed" time of the file
 - -c <date> C, set the "created" time of the file
 - -e <date> E, set the "mft entry modified" time of the file
 - -z <date> set all four attributes (MACE) of the file
 - -v show the UTC (non-local time) MACE values for file
 - -b sets the MACE timestamps so that EnCase shows blanks -r does the same recursively , Know as the Craig option
- For setting an arbitrary time recursively:

Command:

for /R c:\users\ %i in (*) do timestomp.exe %i -z "Monday 3/12/2099 10:00:00PM"



AltDS

- Alternate data streams
 type mypr0n.jpg disney.jpg:hide
 mspaint disney.jpg:hide
- Hit or miss with file carving
- Practical Guide to Alternative Data Streams in NTFS <u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/altds</u>





Steganography

Hiding stuff in stuff so people don't find your stuff)

- With encryption, most times people know that some data is there, just not what it is.
- With Stego, they hopefully will not even know it's there.

http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/ste ganography-intro





Steganography (Tacked on)

- Since jpegs care about what is in the first part of a file, and zips care about what is at the end, you can try the following:
- copy /B image.jpg+putty.zip test.jpg
- Please note, not all jpeg viewers will accept the file.





Steganography

(Insertion)

Example: Putting a file inside of a DOCX, it's just a ZIP file with some XML, just add your inserted file name into [Content_Types].xml so the DOCX does not report as corrupted. Or use my code at:


<u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/ms-</u> <u>office-stego-code</u>



Steganography

(Additive)

- LSB (Least Significant Bit), for example making imperceptible changes to a format that can take loss and still be useful (audio, images, video).
- http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/unicode-and-lsb-stego-code



Lemonwipe (rude and crude)

Not recommended from a legal standpoint, but funny.

Repeat script to feed into DD:

@Echo Off

:TOP

type %1

Goto TOP

Command:

repeat.bat adrianbeer.jpg | dd of=\\.\f:

Create one big file: @Echo Off :TOP type %1 >>%2\%1 if not %errorlevel%==0 goto :error Goto TOP :error echo Exiting and deleting %2\%1 del %2\%1 exit /B -1 Command: Smack.bat image.jpg f:



Booby Trapped Device?

 Programmable HID USB Keyboard/Mouse Dongle PHUKD <u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/pro</u> grammable-hid-usb-keystroke-dongle





Two partitions on a thumbdrive

Two partitions on a thumb drive? Windows sees

🔛 Computer Management								- I X
<u>File Action View H</u> elp								
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	Disk 1 Basic		(H: (I:)					
	3.03 GB Online			GB FAT: hy (Log				
	Disk 2				1			
	Removable	(F:)	7					
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	Оср. пом.о.		<u>P</u>		1	•		
		Primary partitio	n 📕 Extende	ed partition	📕 Free space 📘	Log		

Cloud Computing?

- Use the browser's privacy mode, and SSL
- □ If it's not on the drive, they can't find it on the drive
- Less 4th amendment protection?
- Find a country that does not work well with US law enforcement

Attack the forensic software?

- XSS, not just for web forms anymore <u>http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/xss-sql-and-command-inject-vectors</u>
- Breaking Forensics Software: Weaknesses in Critical Evidence Collection (Encase and Sleuth Kit)
 ISEC Partners presentation at Defcon 15 <u>http://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-archives/dc-15-archive.html#Palmer</u>
- 42.zip = 4.5 PetaBytes
 <u>http://www.unforgettable.dk/</u>
 <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zip_bomb</u>
- Two comments on these attacks:
 - 1. If the examiner sees the data attacking him, they will know something is up.
 - 2. Do you really think it's a good idea to piss off the forensic examiner?

Thermite

- http://hackaday.com/2008/09/16/how-tothermite-based-hard-drive-anti-forensicdestruction/
- Uhm, just no.
- Destruction of evidence charges
- Fire hazard
- Just use full drive encryption
- While we are on that topic: <u>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bv5LHamqAsl</u>



NUKE IT FROM ORBIT It's the only way to be sure





Wipe Tools

- DD
 - dd if=/dev/zero of=\\.\f: --progress bs=1M dd if=/dev/zero of=\\.\Volume{de891b6a-8432-11de-86d4-005056c00008} bs=1M –progress
- DBAN <u>http://www.dban.org/</u>
- HDD Wipe Tool <u>http://hddguru.com/content/en/software/2006.04.</u> <u>13-HDD-Wipe-Tool/</u>



One wipe?

- Magnetic Force Microscopy
 http://sansforensics.wordpress.com/2009/01/15/overwriting-hard-drive-data/
- On a pristine modern drive 92% chance to recover the correct previous bit , 56% on a used drive
- Probabilities multiply, so to get one byte: .92^8=51% (more or less)

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■ For 1 Kilobyte= 2.238e-297

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http://Irongeek.com

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Enhanced Secure Erase

Not only is it faster, but it can wipe remapped blocks (bad sectors) from the G-LIST

- HDParm <u>http://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase</u>
- MHDD

<u>http://hddguru.com/content/en/software/2005.10.02-MHDD/</u> <u>http://hddguru.com/content/en/software/2006.02.10-Magic-Boot-Disk/</u>

HDDErase <u>http://cmrr.ucsd.edu/people/Hughes/SecureErase.shtml</u>



Full System Drive Encryption

BitLocker

http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ windows-vista/features/bitlocker.aspx

- Built in to Windows Vista/7
- AES CBC
- Pain to setup in Vista
- Look into Bitlocker To Go to secure your USB drive
- To enable Bitlocker without TPM in Win 7, gpedit.msc > Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > BitLocker Drive Encryption > Operating System Drives > Require Additional Authentication at Startup > Enable
- Bitlocker Modes: TPM only TPM + PIN
 TPM + PIN + USB Key
 TPM + USB Key
 USB Key

TrueCrypt

http://www.truecrypt.org/

- Open source (for review of a lot of eyes)
- Read from other platforms
- Works on XP
- More cipher options
- Uses XTS which is better than CBC, but ask a cryptographer why
- Also, look into hardware based options <u>http://www.enovatech.net/</u>



http://lrongeek.com

Thanks <u>Doubleback</u> for the Win 7 without TPM info

How about running a VM form an encrypted volume?

- Easy to do
- I have some concern about data leaking into swap/ page file. This needs more testing.
- A few suggested tweaks:

MemAllowAutoScaleDown = "FALSE" mainMem.useNamedFile = "FALSE"

 Use some of the page file wiping techniques mentioned before

http://Irongeek.com

Thanks to Nicholas for some input on this



Other tools

- Deft Linux <u>http://www.deftlinux.net/</u>
- FTK Imager <u>http://www.accessdata.com/downloads.html</u>
- WinHex
 <u>http://www.x-ways.net/winhex/</u>



How do I know someone had ran antiforensics software on a computer?

- No 100% positive way
- Look for files names I mentioned in this presentation
- Leftovers from the tool, for example: HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\SDelete\EulaAccepted
- I need to work on some tools to do this sort of detection...
- Look at the drive for large sections of all zeros/random bytes, but this could be for other reasons (Vista & < after full format, Solid-state Drives)
- Hash search of know anti-forensics tools
 HashMyFiles
 <u>http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash_my_files.html</u>



Change the hash of the file ③

- If it's just the hash, change a few bytes, preferably in strings
- Compile from source if you have it
- Use a packer

UPX

http://upx.sourceforge.net/

http://sourceforge.net/projects/upxer/files/

Shikata Gai Nai from Metasploit <u>http://www.metasploit.com</u>





Events

- Free ISSA classes
- ISSA Meeting <u>http://issa-kentuckiana.org/</u>
- Louisville Infosec
 <u>http://www.louisvilleinfosec.com/</u>
- Phreaknic/Notacon/OuterzOne <u>http://phreaknic.info</u> <u>http://notacon.org/</u> <u>http://www.outerzOne.org/</u>



Helping with the free classes

- Got old hardware you would like to donate?
- Is there a subject you would like to teach?
- Let others know about upcoming classes, and the videos of previous classes.



Thanks

- Scott Moulton
 <u>http://www.myharddrivedied.com/</u>
- Tyler "Trip" Pitchford
- Folks at ISD and Pauldotcom podcasts
- Louisville ISSA



QUESTIONS?

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